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Abstract
Since the beginning of the 21st century, ASEAN has deepened its regional economic 
integration with its member states showing a confidence to build the ASEAN 
Economic Community by 2015. Throughout the history, ASEAN, as a regional 
organization, has contributed to the formation of the region, including its identity, 
power relations, economic policies, and diplomatic cultures. In what ways have 
researchers tried to understand the evolution of ASEAN’s economic integration? 
How have theoretical discussions been brought to explain the development of 
ASEAN? It is often argued that contestations among different theories illustrate 
the lack of relevance in applying a particular theory to explain the dynamics of 
ASEAN economic integration. This study, however, argues that periodization of 
the historical development of ASEAN regional economic integration correlates 
with the meta-theoretical development on the subject. It also argues that 
ASEAN’s dynamics of multifaceted multilevel integration would provide a case 
suitable for theoretical eclecticism in comprehending the subject.
Key Words:  ASEAN, international relations, political economy, regionalism, 
economic integration.
Introduction
Deepening and widening of regional integration is currently taking place in 
Southeast Asia. In the coming 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) member countries will supposedly start the full implementation of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), an agreement to establish a single market 
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and production base in the region. In addition, Southeast Asia has become the 
locus of regional economic integration in East Asia. China is still the engine of 
growth for East Asia with its stark growth and size, but in terms of economic 
integration process in East Asia, the role of ASEAN has been crucial. The 
establishment of ASEAN Plus Three (APT)1 and East Asia Summit (EAS)2 has 
marked the new development in the East Asian regional economic integration, 
however least institutionalized. 
Economic integration among Northeast Asian countries prior to the 
establishment of APT and EAS was difficult due to political problems among 
states in the region. Various diplomatic issues and leadership problems often 
inhibited motivation to regional economic integration in the region. Diplomatic 
issues such as territorial disputes and colonial legacies often brought political 
disharmony between Japan, China and South Korea. Despite burgeoning economic 
relations between the three countries, institutionalization of regional economic 
integration was difficult prior to the establishment of APT in 1998. The inception 
of China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit in 2008 was made possible by the 
three major powers’ mutual confidence during interaction in the earlier regional 
arrangements, namely the APT and EAS. Recently, during the ASEAN summit 
meeting in Bali in 2011, ASEAN was also lauded by many leaders, including 
US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, for its contribution in organizing EAS and 
mediating informal meetings between North and South Korea despite the Six 
Party Talks’ 3 breakdown.
Only a few decades ago in 1960s and 1970s, ASEAN was criticized for its low 
institutionalization and slow integration process. Compared to its counterpart 
in Europe, ASEAN was seen with pessimistic views for the prospect of its 
integration.4 The region was torn by inter-state conflicts and the Cold War great 
1. The APT meeting started in 1998 to discuss ASEAN cooperation with its Northeast Asian 
partners. Membership of this forum includes 10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South 
Korea. 
2. EAS is a forum with extended membership from APT to promote cooperation between the 
participants. This forum includes APT members plus India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and 
the United States. Since 2005, the forum has been actively discussing political and economic 
cooperation among participating countries. Some of the issues discussed are Myanmar’s law 
reform, East Asian comprehensive economic partnership, climate change, energy security, and 
environment.
3. Six Party Talks includes the US, China, Russia, Japan and two Koreas in a forum for 
resolving North Korean nuclear ambition. 
4. See for instance, Shee Poon Kim, “A Decade of ASEAN: 1967-1977”, Asian Survey, Vol. 17, 
No. 8, (August, 1977). 
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power competition.5 Today, ASEAN is commonly viewed as one of the successful 
regional organizations in the world. Many scholars argue for the vital role of 
ASEAN in resolving regional security challenges and maintaining the balance of 
power in the region.6 In economic integration, ASEAN is believed to have no less 
importance in enhancing East Asian economic cooperation and interdependence.7 
This development in the region has led many scholars and observers to 
question the identity, role and function of ASEAN in international order, regional 
affairs, and national interests. What is ASEAN? Why is it significant? How has 
ASEAN become significant? What is the source of its significance? 
This paper is a modest effort to contribute to the theoretical discussion on 
regionalism. It identifies the gap between the preexisting general theories of 
international relations and the practice of regionalism in Southeast Asian history. 
Aiming at bridging the gap, this paper also discusses various particularistic 
theories which try to explain ASEAN regionalism. In assessing the development 
of studies on ASEAN regionalism, we have divided the studies into four phases: 
(1) formation phase (1967-1976), during which ASEAN was mostly political, 
while economic cooperation was non-existent; (2) cooperation phase (1976-1992), 
during which ASEAN began regional economic cooperation and built economic 
and political bases for economic integration; (3) initial integration phase (1992-
2002), when ASEAN started negative economic integration (tariff reduction) 8 
and expanded ASEAN membership to include all 10 countries in Southeast Asia; 
and (4) acceleration phase (2003-now) when ASEAN has consolidated its form of 
economic integration with the signing of a single market and production base. We 
will conclude our discussion by highlighting the validity of theoretical eclecticism 
in explaining the evolution of ASEAN’s regional economic integration which has 
long been contested by various different theoretical models. Debating supremacy 
5. See for instance, Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), Chapter 2. 
6. See for instance Yang Razali Kassim, “The New Great Game: ASEAN’s Balancing Act?”, 
RSIS Commentaries, No. 014/2012, 17 January 2012; and See Seng Tan, “ASEAN, the United 
Nations and Security in Southeast Asia: Problem, Prospect and Paradox”, in Phillip De 
Lombaerde, Francis Baert and Tania Felicio (eds.), The United Nations and Third World Report 
on Regional Integration, (New York: Springer, 2012).
7. See R. James Ferguson, “ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospect for Participant Regional 
Development”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 3, (December 2004); and Anita Prakash 
and Ikumo Isono, “ASEAN in the Global Economy: an Enhanced Economic and Political Role”, 
ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2012-1, (January 2012).
8. The term “negative integration” is used to represent regional economic integration through 
tariff reduction as the opposite of “positive integration” through policy harmonization. 
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of one model is no longer persuasive in understanding the dynamics of ASEAN 
regionalism in the age of globalism. Rather, it is important to identify how 
different theoretical models coexist and complement each other. 
Regional Economic Integration in Theory
Regional economic integration is generally considered as part of the larger 
process towards political and social integration. Interrelations between politics, 
society and economy may make economic integration inseparable from the 
political and social integration process. First, it is because economic integration 
requires political process of bargaining, collaboration and coordination of economic 
policies among participating states. Second, as neo-functionalists typically argue, 
economic integration is usually followed by a spillover in political and security 
integration.9 
This does not necessarily mean that studying regional economic integration 
would fall into reductionism. Most explanations on regional economic integration 
that can be found in the various theories either include political and social aspects 
or complementary in those aspects. For instance, neo-realism and neoliberal-
institutionalism tend to see that international structure provides necessary 
impetus for states to form a regional organization. They differ in the types of 
structure as the factor; while neorealism tends to emphasize power structure, 
balance of power, and great power competition, neoliberal-institutionalism 
emphasizes interdependence, collective action problem, and cooperation. Despite 
the difference, both theories view the international structure of power as 
contributing significantly to the drive of regionalism. The formation of ECSC 
(European Coal and Steel Community) in 1950s and AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement) in the 1990s represent the influence of international politics on their 
formation in the old and new regionalism. While the ECSC was established in 
response to the bipolar world order during the Cold War, AFTA was formed in 
response to the rise of China and regionalism elsewhere that would incite trade 
diversion to such new regional arrangements as European Union (EU), North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur, 
9. To ASEAN countries, which are in accordance to the larger East Asian point of view, 
economic cooperation is an important means in maintaining security. This view was influenced 
by the idea of “comprehensive security” that originated in Japan’s security policy in 1980s. 
Comprehensive security is rooted on the postwar success of Japan’s security policy based on 
Yoshida doctrine. See Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Comprehensive Security Policy Strategy: A New 
East Asian Environment”, Asia Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4, (April 1991), p. 325. 
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South American Common Market). Here we see that economic integration has 
been arranged on the backdrop of international politics, whereas explaining 
the motivator of regional economic integration cannot be detached from the 
international political background. 
In other words, studying regional economic integration comprehensively 
would have to include many aspects, including political and social aspects. 
The use of an economic approach to measure economic integration does provide 
valuable assessment on the welfare effects of integration, but the processes and 
motivations of integration cannot be explained by economics alone. 
1. Processes and Levels
Explaining comprehensively regional economic integration can be done by 
expounding the institutional processes in all levels of analysis. The institutional 
process of regional economic integration can be divided into three categories: (1) 
genesis, (2) forms, and (3) effects.10 The level of analysis on the studies on regional 
economic integration is usually found in three different levels: (1) systemic, (2) 
regional, and (3) domestic levels.11 Let us briefly examine them below.
On the genesis of regional organization, there are numerous debates on 
the factors affecting the process of each and every institution. Three groups of 
10. Etel Solingen, “The Genesis, Forms and Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East 
Asia and the Middle East”, International Studies Quarterly No. 52, (2008), p. 261.
11. See for instance Louis J. Kantory and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of 
Region: A Comparative Approach, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970); Mohtar Masoed, Ilmu 
Hubungan Internasional: Disiplin dan Metodologi (International Relations: Discipline and 
Methodology), (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 1994); Nuraeni S., Deasy Silva, and Arifin Sudirman, 
Regionalisme dalam Studi Hubungan International (Regionalism in International Relations), 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2010). In Kantory and Spiegel’s words, the three levels are 
systemic, sub-ordinate, and internal levels. Nuraeni (et.al.) uses different terms for the same 
constructs: i.e. international, regional and domestic levels. In many studies on international 
politics, regional level politics is seldom analyzed. Most IR scholars and political economists 
concentrate their analysis on international and domestic levels. See, for instance, Robert D. 
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games”, International 
Organization, Vol. 43, No. 2, (June 1988). In regional studies, political interactions, regional 
policymaking, and power interplay among states within a given region, more often provide 
different –if not more important– factor(s) from the political processes in the international and 
domestic levels. For instance, the Philippines and Singapore’s aspiration for regional economic 
integration had to wait for some 15 years until AFTA was signed on, when their aspiration met 
regional policy convergence. It shows that regional level policymaking is happen in different 
locus from domestic level. Regional trade liberalization despite GATT/WTO (General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade/ World Trade Organization), also proofs regions as a different locus of 
policymaking and political processes from the international level. This explains why factors of 
regionalism in the regional level needs to be analyzed separately from international level. 
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theories often applied in the regionalism studies are neorealism, neoliberal-
institutionalism, and constructivism. Neorealism and neoliberal-institutionalism, 
as already mentioned briefly above, emphasize the power structure, globalization, 
and interdependence. Constructivism offers quite a different methodology in 
explaining the factors of regionalism. Constructivism emphasizes the role of 
ideas, culture and norms in the formation of a regional organization, as factors 
that constructivists view are derived from identity. Through the process of 
socialization, the ideas, culture and norms of a regional identity would materialize 
in a certain form of regional integration. 
The forms of regional organization can take many types depending on the 
depth of its integration. According to Balassa12, states in a region can take one of 
six types of regional integration; these are: (1) preferential trading arrangement 
(PTA); (2) free trade agreement (FTA); (3) customs union; (4) common market; 
(5) economic union; and (6) political union. This typology was based on the scope 
of liberalization of each regional economic arrangement, starting with trade 
liberalization, policy coordination, monetary union, and finally supranational 
governing institution formation. Other forms aside from this typology are also 
discussed in the regionalism studies, for example, ‘soft’ and ‘transnational’ 
regionalism, in which institutionalization of regional integration does not follow 
the commonly thought regionalism such as listed by Balassa. In soft regionalism, 
institutional arrangements are loose and flexible, where interdependence in the 
region increases autonomously. This type of regionalism is often called market-
driven integration. Transnational regionalism refers to the process of increasing 
interaction and interdependence in the region among people or non-state actors in 
the region. In this type of regionalism, there is supposedly a significant increase 
in people’s mobility, social networks, and shared culture. 
The effects of regional integration can be divided into two, which are static 
and dynamic effects. The static effects refer to the impact of regional economic 
integration on the welfare of participating members of the organization. 
Integration can be welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing to the participating 
countries, depending on the trade and investment creation and diversion in 
the region. These static effects are conveniently measurable by econometrics 
and statistics. Dynamic effects refer to the impacts of regional integration on 
the regional cohesiveness, convergence, regional peace and stability, diplomatic 
leverage, and convergence to multilateralism. In some regions, especially among 
12. Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1961), p. 
68.
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the “third world” or the “South”, the dynamic effects of regional integration are 
more important than static effects, since the latter require a certain degree of 
complementarity and policy convergence. 
Among the three levels of analysis mentioned above, the systemic level incites 
more debate as its impacts are often immeasurable; its information is mostly 
unstated or tacitly stated, and the policy responses are indirectly targeted to the 
systemic challenge. For instance, the formation of the EU is believed by many 
realists to be related to the Cold War structure and great power competition 
between the United States and the former Soviet Union. ASEAN was also created 
in 1967 and believed to be a regional response to the expansive characteristics of 
Vietnam during the Cold War. However, the form of regional cooperation was not 
military alliances, and it addressed more political, economic and socio-cultural 
policies rather than military-security policy. 
Still in the context of systemic level analysis, globalization/interdependence 
and economic crisis are two variables frequently mentioned and studied 
in assessing the formation of a regional organization. Globalization affects 
international relations in any given region. Increasing economic interdependence 
provides both opportunities and challenges to states. Regional economic 
integration is seen as one alternative for collective action problem in coping with 
the challenges and grasping opportunities in the age of globalism. 
Economic crises make states with high proportions of foreign trade vulnerable 
to economic downturn. They become less capable of maintaining macroeconomic 
stability in the face of big crisis, without support and assistance from external 
financial powers, be they states in bilateral relations or international and regional 
organizations in multilateral relations. In the absence of effective support and 
assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs), regional financial and 
monetary cooperation is considered the second best policy in facing the crisis. 
During and in the aftermath of crisis, states in a region often look for deepening 
integration in order to strengthen the capacity of regional organizations in 
assisting and supporting states in economic crisis. 
At the lower level, namely the regional or sub-ordinate, four groups of theories 
offer explanations on factors, processes, form variations, and effects of regional 
economic integration, interaction among participating members of the regional 
organization is the focus of the studies. Many theories have been developed 
and debated in regionalism studies, such as hegemony and distributive gains 
(neorealism), regional cohesion, spillover and institutionalization (neoliberal-
institutionalization), shared ideas, culture, norms and its socialization 
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(constructivism), and structure of production, development gap and states-
regional market relations (rationalism).
At the domestic or internal level, several factors are argued to have important 
effects on the regional economic integration. Realism emphasizes that national 
interests and policy preferences determine the integration process. Neoliberal- 
institutionalism tends to focus on policy convergence among participating states. 
Regime type and democratization are also believed to have significant impact on 
regional integration, as democratic peace theory insists. Rationalism argues that 
domestic coalitions, nationalism-protectionism orientation, state convergence, 
civil society activism, and business networks also contribute to the formation 
of a regional economy. Constructivism offers an analysis of identities and social 
process that lead to regional policy. 
Levels of analysis and stages of institutional process mentioned here 
provide analytical tools to depict the complexity of regional economic integration. 
Understanding the overall process of regional integration at every level would give 
us more systematic empirical explanations and theory mapping. Throughout the 
rest of this article, we will elaborate the evolution of ASEAN economic integration 
within this framework. But before we do that, let us first discuss briefly a few 
theories that have been applied in studies on ASEAN economic integration. 
2. Theoretical Variants of Regional Integration
Debates on the theorization of regional integration have a relatively long 
record in history. One can note that there are at least six groups of theories on 
regionalism.13 The first is a pure economic theory, focusing on the static effects of 
regionalism. Influenced by Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage and theory 
of second best to Pareto optimum, economists have argued that regionalism is 
a second best option in the absence of efficient and effective global multilateral 
trade arrangement. Among economists, Jacob Viner14 is acknowledged as the 
prominent scholar that produced a seminal work where he introduced the concepts 
of trade diversion and creation in the 1950s. Viner’s theory is often used to explain 
13. See Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001) pp. 341-361. Gilpin divides theories on 
regional integration into two big groups, which are economic theories and political theories. 
Economic theories are influenced by neoinstitutionalism and new political economy. Political 
theories include federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, neoinstitutionalism, domestic 
politics, intergovernmentalism, and realism. In this article, we discuss only five major groups of 
theories plus constructivism, which gains more popularity today. 
14. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, (New York: Garland, 1983).
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the genesis and effects of regional integration at all levels of analysis. 
The second group is federalist theories. Federalists have based their research 
on the past federalist projects pursued by states such as the US in the 18th 
century, German unification in 19th century, and Austro-Hungary federation in 
the interwar period (1920-1938). Federalists argue that regional political 
integration can function as a scheme to solve the problem of war. Federalism 
appeal is thought to be able to invite voluntary participation from states in a 
region. The argument of voluntary participation has been criticized however, as 
the occurrence of political unification in modern world history mostly resulted 
from war and conquest. Gilpin argues that US federalism was enabled by the 
victory of the North over the South in the Civil War. Similarly, Germany was 
unified by the conquest of Prussia over other German nationals. This implies two 
weaknesses in the federalist approach. First, there is no precedent correlation 
between voluntary participation and federalist political unification. Second, even 
if policy convergence among participants of regional integration can be associated 
with voluntary participation, most regions in recent history do not adopt the 
federalist unification as the form of their institutions. Thus, the ahistorical and 
non-contextual federalist approach has the least explanatory power to the current 
move towards regional integration.
The third group is functionalism and neo-functionalism. David Mitrany15 
argues that regional political integration can be reached by developing functional 
cooperation in such certain or specific fields as health, postal service, technology, 
food and agriculture. Mitrany assumed that the growth of economic relations 
and technology would provide the imperative for states to pursue international 
cooperation in specific functions. In time, when the international organization 
proved to be beneficial in solving the specific functions, states would grow 
confidence in the organization and delegate more tasks. In the long term, the 
growing international organization would generate political integration where the 
importance of boundaries diminishes. 
Neofunctionalism is in agreement with functionalism in the imperative 
of international organization and the then introduced concept of “spillover”. 
Neofunctionalist theorists such as Haas16 and Schmitter17, suggest that 
15. See David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, (London: LSEPS, 1976).
16. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (1950-1957), 
(London: Stevens and Sons, 1958).
17. See Phillippe C. Schmitter, “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration”, International 
Organization Vol. 24, No. 4, (Autumn 1970), and “Three Neo-functional Hypotheses about 
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international organization is a necessity for technocratic controlling of 
international economic relations. The role of domestic social and economic groups 
on states’ regionalist policies is viewed as essential in the formation of regional 
organization. Based on their study on the European experience, the theory 
suggests that the regional economic integration process in one area of cooperation 
would “spillover” into other areas and in time would lead to political community. 
The logic of spillover is often criticized as regional organizations vary in their 
development, or setbacks. 
Functionalism is a very ambitious group of theory. Basically, functionalists 
question the problem of genesis, institutional form, and impact of regional 
integration in regional and domestic level. Their assumption of regionalism as a 
gradual process and spillover expectation meet many scholars’ interest. 
The fourth group is neoliberal-institutionalism. This approach emphasizes 
the importance of institutions to manage growing interdependence and collective 
action problems. According to Keohane (1984), institutions reduce uncertainty, 
enhance coordination, lower transaction costs, monitor compliance, detect 
defections, increase opportunities for cooperation, reduce the costs of retaliation, 
facilitate issue-linkages, and offer focal points of salient solutions.18 As the 
neoliberal-institutionalists assume that democracy plays important role in a 
state’s cooperative gestures, the theorists consider that the market’s role in 
integration also contributes to the regional integration movement. Neoliberal-
institutionalism includes all levels of analysis at all stages of institutional process. 
This approach is, however, criticized for its inability to explain structure and 
conflicts between members of a given regional organization. 
The next two groups are neorealism and constructivism. Neorealism is the 
most debated approach to regionalism. Neorealists argue that they provide 
better explanations on states’ responses to the power structure, conflicts in 
the regional integration, and how regional economic integration contributes to 
the maintenance of peace and stability in a region. This paradigm is useful in 
explaining the genesis and institutional form of regional integration, especially at 
the systemic and regional levels, as long as inter-state relations are in concern. 
But it is not without criticism. Neorealism is challenged by other approaches 
such as neoliberalism and constructivism. Neoliberal-institutionalism finds 
that domestic politics, rather than state as unitary actor, plays crucial role in 
formulating regionalist policies. Moreover, in some regional organizations, the 
International Integration”, International Organization Vol. 23, No. 1, (Winter 1969).
18. As quoted by Solingen (2008), Op.Cit., p. 263.
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presence of hegemon and balance of power has no correlation to the region 
building.  
The birth of constructivism in the late 1980s brought a new categorization 
in the international studies. Not only do Constructivists criticize realism, but also 
liberalism, and subsume the two approaches under the “rationalist” approach. 
Focusing their studies on the aspects of identity such as ideas, culture, norms 
and socialization, constructivism argues that the ideational forces of regionalism 
play an important role in the construction of a region, aside from material forces 
which have been studied by the rationalist approach. The interaction between 
ideational and material forces through the process of socialization produces the 
form of regional integration. Constructivists argue that rationalist explanations 
on regional integration are insufficient as they merely focus on material forces of 
the process and neglect the ideational forces. Constructivists are mostly focused 
their study on the institutional processes of regional integration at the regional 
level.
Rationalists, while admitting the importance of ideational forces, insist that 
“material forces” play a more important role in regional integration than identity. 
Analyzing crises as events that accelerate integration, for instance, cannot be seen 
as an identity problem. Resolving economic or monetary crisis requires immediate 
macroeconomic and industrial adjustment policies, apart from the aspects of 
identity. Regional efforts to resolve or mitigate crisis, although related to regional 
identity, focus not on preserving or developing identity itself, but on the crisis. 
Another example of the rationalist counter-argument concerns geopolitical 
conflicts in a region. Shared ideas, cultures and norms simply lack the explanatory 
power on the occurrence of territorial disputes. Rationalism tends to try to explain 
all levels of analysis and stages of institutional processes.  
The applicability of these theories on ASEAN regional economic integration is 
one appealing question. At the age of 45, ASEAN has been the focus of thousands 
of researches on the integration process using the various approaches we have 
discussed above. As ASEAN has evolved through the years from its earlier format 
as a part of Cold War situated regionalism into the upcoming ASEAN Community, 
comprising the ASEAN Political and Security Community, the ASEAN Economic 
Community, and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community in 2015, theorization 
of ASEAN regional integration may also evolve following the actual evolution 
of ASEAN. The next section of this article will discuss various theorizations of 
ASEAN regional economic integration and how to best explain ASEAN’s evolving 
regionalism. 
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Parallel Evolution of Economic Integration Practice and Research
1. Formation Phase (1967-1975)
ASEAN has evolved throughout history despite its distinctive character19 that 
has invited skepticism towards its future development and sustainability. ASEAN 
was established in August 1967 by five countries in Southeast Asia, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The formation of 
this organization situated in a great power competition during the Cold War and 
the presence of a security threat brought by communist Vietnam. At the regional 
level, the region was conflict-prone. The member states were having security 
issues against each other or other state(s). Establishment of ASEAN was 
considered as a collective response from five anti-communist states to the upsurge 
of communist Vietnam and great power competition in the region. 
As a regional institution, ASEAN was not getting as much attention as its 
counterpart in the Western Europe during the 1960s or in the first decade of 
its formation. There were at least two reasons for this. Firstly, the weight of the 
regional organization in international relations was not as significant as the EU. 
While the EU consisted of 15 Western European states with several industrial 
and influential members of the North, ASEAN was formed by five developing 
countries with less significant influence in the international system. Secondly, 
ASEAN’s institutional design did not progress much during its first decade. EU 
was an enhanced form of previous institutions namely ECSC (Paris Treaty 1951), 
EEC (Treaty of Rome, 1957), EC (Merger Treaty, 1965). ASEAN did not even have 
an economic ministerial meeting until 1976. Only then ASEAN made the first 
steps towards economic integration by signing on to ASEAN Industrial Projects 
(AIP) in 1976 and ASEAN PTA (1977). Under these two conditions, ASEAN was 
relatively “invisible” to most economists and IR scholars. 
Studies on ASEAN regional integration during the first decade were 
dominated by the neorealist approach. The absence of regional economic 
19. In its economic integration ASEAN revealed three main characteristics that made 
it relatively unique compared to other regionalism. The first is the paradox of its internal 
structure which lack hegemonic leadership but has been able to play an important role in 
maintaining relative peace and stability in the region. The second is its intramural relations 
which has been reluctant and hesitant in implementing the ambitious integration campaign. 
The implementation of PTA, cooperation projects, AFTA and AEC was characterized by 
inconsistencies and flexibilities. The third is its external relations which has been a notable 
achievement that contributes positively to the member countries’ economic development. 
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integration and cooperation made studies on the regional economic integration 
very limited. In 1971, ASEAN states requested the UN to conduct research on the 
regional potentials for future economic cooperation. In 1973, the UN presented 
the Robinson report20 on possibilities of future ASEAN economic cooperation. The 
report recommended ASEAN countries to arrange industrial cooperation projects 
and preferential trade agreement to increase intra-regional trade. With the 
commitment made by Japanese Prime Minister for supporting ASEAN industrial 
cooperation, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed in the 1975 meeting to enhance 
economic cooperation by organizing an ASEAN economic ministerial meeting and 
industrial cooperation projects in 1976, and signing on to PTA in 1977. 
Apart from the report, there were very few publications that specifically 
studied regional economic integration in Southeast Asia in the 1970s. One of 
them was the work of Susumu Yamakage (1977).21 Yamakage’s study on ASEAN 
interdependence in the 1950, 1960 and 1970 suggests that the five ASEAN 
countries were relatively interdependent. ASEAN cohesiveness was clearly 
identifiable when compared to adjacent region that was categorized by Yamakage, 
comprising Taiwan, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, and 
Australia. The levels of interdependence were varied among members and formed 
a certain structure. The core-like interdependence was performed by Malaysia-
Singapore relations. The second level was between Malaysia-Singapore and 
Indonesia-Thailand, while Indonesia and Thailand did not show interdependence. 
The Philippines was particularly isolated from the others. Interdependence 
between ASEAN members and the adjacent region also showed variations. Taiwan 
in 1950, and Laos and Vietnam in 1970 were interdependent with their ASEAN 
counterparts, while Burma was dependent.  
Quite contrary to the minimum institutional development of economic 
integration, in the politico-security aspects, ASEAN made significant milestone 
for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region during the first decade. 
Two agreements were signed during the first decade, which were the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) in 1976. Both documents were essential as instruments for 
regional peace and stability maintenance. As the great powers agreed to sign 
20. For the origin of the report and cooperation, please refer to Kazushi Shimizu, “The Origin 
of Intra-ASEAN Economic Cooperation”, The Economic Journal of Hokkaido University, Vol. 33 
(July 2004), p. 120. 
21. See Susumu Yamakage, “Interdependence of ASEAN Region: The Transaction Analysis of 
Trade Flows (1950, 1960, and 1970)”, South East Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, (September 1977).
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and comply with the TAC, ASEAN countries could prevent the contagion of great 
power competition to the Southern part of Southeast Asia where the five ASEAN 
countries located. 
Research on ASEAN regional integration thus put more weight on these 
political and security aspects. Realist approach on the balance of power in the 
region dominated the studies. Most studies argued that the formation of ASEAN 
was necessary in serving three different purposes. First, ASEAN was necessary 
particularly in building confidence and interaction among the member countries. 
Second, and most important, ASEAN was functional in containing the spread of 
Cold War conflict to the Southern part of Southeast Asia. And third, much related 
to economic cooperation, ASEAN had become an effective collective diplomatic 
vehicle for the member countries. ASEAN diplomacy “won” the Japanese support 
for restriction of synthetic rubber production and met the Japanese need to 
transform its industrial policy which later contributed to the formation of regional 
production network in Southeast Asia.22 
Research at the time was even able to identify the gap between the discourses 
of ASEAN formation with the reality of regional practice of the institution. 
Although the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 emphasized cooperation in economic, 
social and cultural aspects, the absence of such cooperation in the first decade 
confirmed the true nature of ASEAN formation, which was regional response to 
the Indochina crisis of the communist upsurge.23 Factors from the systemic and 
regional level became the focus of analysis during this phase. 
2. Cooperation Phase (1976-1992)
The second phase of ASEAN’s history of regional economic integration was 
between 1976 and 1992. In this phase, ASEAN implemented PTA in 1977; AIP 
although signed in 1976 by the member states, but only started effectively in 1980; 
ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) in 1981; and ASEAN Industrial Joint 
Venture (AIJV) in 1983. The success of the implementation of these cooperation 
projects and preferential trade was modest. AIP was difficult to implement 
because of financial and political reasons. Most investors were more interested 
22. See for instance Donald E. Nuechterlein, “The Prospect for Regional Security in Southeast 
Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 9, (September 1968); Justus M. Van der Kroef, “ASEAN Security 
Needs and Policies, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2, (Summer 1974); Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: 
Problems and Prospects, (Singapore: ISEAS, 1975); and Michael Leifer, “Regional Order in 
Southeast Asia: An Uncertain Prospect”, The Round Table, Vol. 64, Issue 255 (1974). 
23. See for instance, Russel H. Fifield, “ASEAN’s Image and Reality”, Asia Survey, Vol. 19, No. 
12, (December 1979).
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in investing in individual country’s industrial project rather than regional. The 
projects were faced with shortage of fund, despite Japan’s pledge to provide 1 
million dollars. Slow decision-making and bureaucratization added to the problem 
of implementing the projects. PTA was also difficult because members enlisted 
mostly non-traded goods (90%) to the inclusion list of preferential tariff until it 
was improved in 1987. The increase of intra-regional trade occurred, but reflected 
more of the regional economic development, instead of a result of preferential 
tariff and regional industrial projects.24 
It is interesting to note that three economic crises preceded the commitment 
renewals to regional economic cooperation. The first two crises were oil crisis in 
1973 and 1977, while the third was the 1985 global economic crisis. During the 
1970s crises, Indonesia and Malaysia as oil producers were not affected by the oil 
price increase, but responded rather positively to the cooperation proposals. But 
in the 1980s, all members, including Brunei Darussalam which joined ASEAN 
in 1985, were affected by the decreasing world market demands. The pour of 
Japanese investment in 1985 following Plaza Accord was believed as a necessary 
condition to ASEAN economies’ survival through the crisis. Combined with 
the creation of NAFTA and the rise of China, there were fears among ASEAN 
countries of trade and investment diversion to other regions. This was the point 
where AFTA turned the page of a new phase in ASEAN economic integration. 
Scholarship on the political economy of the region was mainly focusing on 
the individual country’s economic development instead of regional integration. 
Two main reasons can be found. First, ASEAN countries’ economic development 
was impressive during the 1970s and 1980s. The average economic growth of the 
5 original members until 1985 was 10% annually, with Thailand and Singapore 
grew above 10% annually. ASEAN countries were considered as the next tier of 
Newly Industrial Economies (NIEs) in Asia, after the success story of the four so-
called “Asian Tigers”, namely Hongkong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. 
Secondly, Southeast Asian economies presented a different model of development 
and capitalism. This provided the opportunities for the scholarship in the region 
to develop the political economy studies of this region into a wide range of 
perspectives, starting from Japanese-led production network, state authoritarian 
developmentalism, third tier of flying geese, ersatz capitalism, comprador 
capitalism, to bureaucratic patrimonialism.25
24. Antonia Hussey, “Regional Development and Cooperation through ASEAN”, Geographical 
Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1991).
25. For a review on various studies of Southeast Asian economic development, see Regina 
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The rich array of scholarship on the political economy of the region 
contributed significantly to the study of regionalism in ASEAN. Except for 
the regional production network and industrial transfer, other theories have 
provided the explanation of the economic policy orientation of ASEAN states and 
the character of its capitalism. The character and policy orientation of ASEAN 
economies contributed significantly to the low-pace regionalist policy-making. 
However, the construction of the regional production network since the 1970s was 
considered essential in enhancing regional economic interdependence, indicated 
by the relative increase of intra-regional trade. 
Studies on the regional economic integration at that time mainly focused on 
the problem of the non-progressive nature of ASEAN-PTA and industrial projects. 
The sources of that nature were found at the regional and domestic levels. At 
the regional level, the “ASEAN way” of informality, flexibility, non-interference 
and consensus-oriented decision-making was criticized. In addition, realists 
noted the absence of hegemony in ASEAN, or at least leadership in the region. 
Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s was already considered the leader in the 
region. However, lacking the vision towards regional integration and economic 
liberalization, Indonesian reluctance toward economic liberalization constrained 
others’ aspiration to regional integration, typically presented by Singapore and 
the Philippines. 
At the domestic level, realists and liberalists noticed several factors which 
had contributed to the reluctance towards regional integration and economic 
liberalization. At ceteris paribus, or the absence of market failure and economic 
crisis, ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly reluctant towards 
liberalization and resorted to nationalist orientation of protectionism in order to 
preserve domestic political legitimation, except for Singapore that was already 
a relatively open economy. The domestic political coalitions, based on Stubbs’ 
study,26 played great importance in the economic policy-making of ASEAN states. 
Liberalists and nationalists in every state compete against each other in the 
domestic politics and policy-making. Economic policy change is a function of 
Abrami and Richard F. Doner, “Southeast Asia and the Political Economy of Development”, in 
Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu (eds.), Southeast Asia in Political Science: 
Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2008). When discussing NIEs, Singapore is usually included in the NIEs instead of ASEAN, and 
similarly, ASEAN in development studies mostly refers to the rest of the member states and 
exclude Singapore.
26. Richard R. Stubbs, “Signing on to Liberalization: AFTA and the politics of regional 
economic cooperation”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 13, Issue 2, (2000).
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changes in domestic coalitions. When liberals dominate the policy-making 
circle, the states tend to accommodate regionalist policy. On the contrary, when 
nationalists dominate the policy-making circle, the governments tend to be 
resistant towards regionalist policy. 
Another salient debate on regional integration during this phase was on the 
influence of investors or capitalists in the region. Some of the neoliberals argued 
that ASEAN construction of regional production networks was market driven, 
that was owing to the role of investors or capitalists.27 Other rationalists argued 
that the states in the region were so dominant that the role of business in the 
region was limited by constraints of states’ policy.28 The role of business in policy-
making only goes as far as the states accommodate. 
3. Initial Phase of Integration (1993-2003)
The third phase in the scholarship of ASEAN regional integration can be said 
as the spring of regionalism studies. Firstly, it was due to the parallel development 
between the actual progress of integration and the theorization of regionalism. 
In the actual practice of regionalism, there had been a new wave regionalism 
since 1985. At the same time, there had also been a new development in 
theorizing this “new regionalism” in the Western scholarship, plus the emergence 
of constructivism in international studies.29 Secondly, the end of the Cold War 
reduced the salience of politico-security factors to the regional institution while 
East Asian economy was rising. Studying ASEAN development using approaches 
that focused only on politico-security factors became insufficient. The acceleration 
of economic integration marked with the signing of AFTA invited many scholars 
to examine the political processes, institutionalization and effects of the 
organization, and it opened more room for studies on regionalism.30 
The main debate on the topic was between liberalism and realism on the 
institutional form, development and genesis of AFTA. Realism still dominated the 
27. See for example Mari Pangestu, Hadi Soesastro and Mubariq Ahmad, “A New Look at 
Intra-ASEAN Cooperation”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 3, (March, 1992). 
28. See Rolf J. Langhammer, “ASEAN Economic Cooperation: A Stock Taking from a Political 
Economy Point of View”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 2, (November 1991). 
29. See for instance, Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism: 
A Palgrave Reader, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
30. The absence of serious economic integration during the first and second phases made ASEAN 
less attractive to regional economic integration studies. PTA and industrial cooperation during 
the 1970s and 1980s were considered insignificant. AFTA was the first economic integration effort 
among ASEAN member states with detailed schedule and implementation scheme.
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theoretical exposition on ASEAN regional economic integration, as its explanation 
supported by the institutional genesis and form of AFTA. The context that 
provided the impetus for AFTA signing is very interesting. 
First, there was an economic crisis in 1985 that caused a slump in ASEAN 
export market, especially in the West, and decline of revenues from oil. ASEAN 
was in need for a collective economic move to increase trade among member 
countries. The idea of forming AFTA was raised again in the 1987 summit meeting 
and agreed upon in 1992. Second, China during the 1980s was growing fast and 
becoming new target for market and production base. Significant trade and 
investment diversion from ASEAN to China already occurred in the early 1990s. 
Apart from that, China already became a larger investment target of ASEAN’s 
major partner, namely Japan. Competing with China’s sheer size and comparative 
advantage, ASEAN realized that it was necessary to deepen integration among its 
member states. Third, in 1986, EU agreed to implement single market by 1992, 
while North American countries, namely the US, Canada and Mexico, agreed to 
establish North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) by 1993. The establishment 
of EU’s single market, NAFTA and the growing China edified ASEAN member 
countries fear of trade and investment diversion to those regions. Fourth, the 
1985 crisis effectively brought liberalist elites into the policy-making circle in 
domestic politics of ASEAN member countries except for Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam. The governments of ASEAN member countries were seeking for 
new macroeconomic approaches in order to survive the crisis and upcoming 
competition. Fifth, the crisis in 1985 was followed by the opportunity created 
by the massive outflow of Japanese FDI as an impact of the signing of the 
Plaza Accord. In order to capture the opportunity while competing with other 
regions, ASEAN was required to increase its appeal for investments. Sixth, the 
end of the Cold War provided both new opportunities and challenges for future 
ASEAN economic integration. Developing economic and diplomatic relations with 
Northeast and Southeast Asian socialist countries was no longer a political issue, 
so that new opportunities to increase economic relations with China, Vietnam, 
Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos were made possible and wide open. The new 
challenge for ASEAN was to find new direction for its institutional significance. 
Realist influence on the studies of the genesis of AFTA was found in the 
role of crisis, great power relations, ideology, hierarchy, and the maintenance 
of regional security and stability.31 The destabilizing factor for ASEAN during 
31. See the work of Sorpong Peou, “Whithering Realism? A Review of Recent Security 
Studies on the Asia-Pacific Region”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, (Winter 2002/2003); Acharya, 
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1990s was still present despite the end of Vietnam-Cambodia conflict. It was 
largely because firstly, territorial disputes among ASEAN countries, and also 
China in the case of South China Sea, were left dormant without institutional 
arrangement for resolution. Secondly, with the end of the Cold War, non-traditional 
security issues became a new security agenda, even for ASEAN countries. Crisis 
remained an important catalyst for ASEAN regional integration as shown by 
the deepening integration since the 1980s crisis and 1997/1998 Asian financial 
crisis. Ideology, as reflected in economic policy, was proven important in analyzing 
ASEAN response to the 1997/1998 financial crisis. IMF’s neoliberal approach to 
assist the crisis-hit countries was seen incompatible to ASEAN’s characteristics 
of strong state and network-driven (bureaucratic-patrimonialism) economy. This 
explains resentments to accede to IMF conditions for assistance from Malaysia, 
and the prolonged crisis in assisted Indonesia.32 
To realists, ASEAN is a regional process to avoid conflict in which economic 
cooperation works as means instead of objective. ASEAN states view the regional 
cooperation as beneficial for individual national interest while bearing no cost, 
especially in delegating sovereignty to supranational institution and the risk of 
interference on domestic affairs.33 The members maintain and support ASEAN 
integration in order to pursue national interests, instead of regional collective 
or shared interests. The benefit of economic cooperation is considered minimum 
compared to diplomatic and political benefits. Some realists even see ASEAN is 
not in any way developing into an economic community.34 The form of ASEAN 
regional cooperation is adapting to the values acceptable to member countries, 
namely the “ASEAN way”, which emphasizes non-interference, mutual respect, 
peaceful dispute settlement, non-use of military force, consensus and dialog in 
decision making. 
op.cit.; Jurgen Ruland, “ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical 
Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2000); 
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japanese Security Policy: the Case of 
ASEAN Regional Forum”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, (1997); Sheldon W. Simon, “Realism 
and Neoliberalism: International Relations Theory and Southeast Asian Security”, The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1995); and John Funston, “Challenges Facing ASEAN in a More Complex 
Age”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 2, (1999).
32. Richard Higgott, “The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment”, New 
Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3, (November 1998).
33. Bilson Kurus, “Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d’etre”, Asian Survey, Vol. 33. 
No. 8, (August, 1993). 
34. Michael Leifer, “ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, (1999), p. 37.
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Still for some realists, ASEAN response to the international order in the 
region that involves major powers such as the US, China, Russia and Japan is 
hierarchic rather than balancing.35 Southeast Asian countries being free to choose, 
“flock to the weaker side” according to Waltz theory, generating a certain regional 
order based on hierarchy, in which balancing and bandwagoning to the great 
powers cannot be concluded based only on power distribution and threats.36 The 
regional order had also been glued by interests, as suggested by Schweller’s 
proposition: “balancing for security and bandwagoning for profit”.37    
Liberalist studies on the region have contributed significantly to the 
exposition of the institutional development of ASEAN and AFTA. The lack 
of institutionalization, according to liberalists, has contributed greatly to the 
ASEAN’s inability to solve many regional problems, such as financial crisis, 
environmental hazard, territorial disputes, human rights violation and economic 
interdependence. But the pre-existing market-driven economic interdependence 
that has generated intra-industry trade and developed regional production 
network in Southeast Asia has enabled rapid growth and economic integration, 
not only in ASEAN, but further into East Asia.38 
The East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 was the test for ASEAN 
cohesiveness at this phase. ASEAN countries tended to resort to national policies 
and IMF assistance in coping with the crisis. Despite this, the member countries 
did not resort to setback in the regional economic integration. Instead, ASEAN 
countries agreed on deepening and widening economic integration to include 
all 10 members and more partners, while continued spillover to investment and 
services liberalization. The crisis showed that ASEAN was less than capable to 
help members in crisis. Financial and monetary cooperation with major powers in 
East Asia was necessary. For the first time in its institutional evolution, ASEAN 
established APT, the momentum that gave the foundation for future East Asian 
regionalism, to include Japan, China and South Korea. 
35. Victor D. Cha, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International 
Relations”, International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, (Winter 2003/2004), p. 172.
36. Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 73.
37. Randal Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1994).
38. See for instance M.C. Abad Jr., “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Challenges 
and Responses”, in Michael Wesley, The Regional Organization of the Asia Pacific: Exploring 
Institutional Change, (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2003); Shaun Narine, “Institutional 
Theory and Southeast Asia, the Case of ASEAN”, World Affairs, Vol. 161, No. 1, (Summer, 1998); 
and Acharya, op.cit. 
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Domestic politics remained the locus of decision making in regionalism in 
Southeast Asia. For ASEAN 6, AFTA had been creating instead of diverting 
trade.39 For the late joiners, namely Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR and 
Vietnam (CLMV), joining AFTA required the transitional economies to make 
adjustment policies, although relatively flexible in pace, depending on each 
country’s preparedness. Despite revenue loss during the first five years of 
joining AFTA, the overall income of the transitional economies was increasing 
while measures of compensating loss were also underway.40 Fukase and Winters 
(2003) argued that the acceleration of domestic reforms in ASEAN new member 
countries was part of dynamic effects of AFTA.41
The main picture on AFTA emphasized the dynamic instead of the static 
effects. From the design, the objective was not to create a regional economic bloc, 
but to strengthen and enhance the pre-existing trade and investment structure. 
The implementation of AFTA did increase trade and concentrated on intra-
industry trade. However, the elimination of barriers to intra-regional trade was 
aimed mostly at increasing ASEAN attractiveness to foreign investment. At 
the same time, each member states liberalized its domestic financial market in 
order to attract foreign investment.42 The member states signed on AFTA for 
national economic benefit rather than regional collective benefit. They were at 
first reluctant to sign on, but after being preceded by Singapore-Thailand FTA, 
they collectively agreed to AFTA. Only after the success of Singapore-Thailand 
FTA, the remaining member states were willing to sign on. This implied that the 
decision to sign AFTA was in large part depended on member states’ consent. 
39. Many have examined the static impacts of AFTA and most agreed that AFTA has been 
creating instead of diverting trade. See for instance, Helen Cabalu and Christina Alfonso, “Does 
AFTA Create Trade or Divert Trade?”, Global Economy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4, (2009). This was 
especially experienced by ASEAN 6, the first signatories of AFTA that include Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
40. Jose L. Tongzon, Habibullah Khan, and Le Dang Doanh, “Options for Managing Revenue 
Losses and Other Adjustment Costs of CLMV Participation in AFTA”, REPSF Project 02/002, 
(October 2004), p. xxxviii.
41. Emiko Fukase and L. Alan Winters, “Possible Dynamic Effects of AFTA for the New 
Member Countries”, The World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 6, (10 July 2003), p. 866-868.
42. Liberalization of financial market in ASEAN countries was underway without proper 
control from the state, including short-term funds. This has led to the 1997/1998 financial crisis. 
See for instance, Stephan Haggard and Andrew MacIntyre, “The Political Economy of the Asian 
Economic Crisis”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Autumn 1998). 
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Studies by Nesadurai43 and Solingen44 reconfirm the importance of domestic 
politics in the making of regionalist policies, especially AFTA. In her study 
on developmental regionalism in ASEAN, Nesadurai argues for employing 
“developmental regionalism” theory in explaining the form of ASEAN regionalism 
in which domestic factors are properly accounted for. According to Nesadurai, 
the systemic level provides initial trigger for regionalism, but it is domestic 
coalitions that determine the final product of regionalist policies based on 
domestic political processes. Based on states’ strategy in response to the systemic 
challenges of globalization, Nesadurai divides three type of regionalism: open, 
resistant, and developmental regionalism. She further suggests that ASEAN 
falls into developmental regionalism category. Solingen’s study on the impact of 
financial crisis on ASEAN regionalism also suggests that domestic coalitional 
composition affects regional integration. According to Solingen, domestic political 
forces conceive and nurture regional integration in order to pursue domestic 
and regional political and economic stability and global access. Although some of 
ASEAN states are dominated by “backlash” elite, Solingen argues that they are 
accommodated and co-opted. Even during the 1997/1998 crisis, the states still 
favored “internationalist” grand strategy in regionalism because of the coalitions.
In this third phase, although limited in number, constructivism also grew 
in the study of ASEAN regional economic integration.45 Most constructivist 
studies on ASEAN regional integration at that time focused only on security 
issues and almost none discussed economic integration in the same proportion as 
security. Karl Deutsch’s notion of “security community” placed a great influence on 
Southeast Asian constructivism. The main question was whether or not ASEAN 
was constructing a security community in the region. Busse (1999) argued that 
social process of states interaction in decades of ASEAN history had shaped 
the regional ‘collective identity’ and shared norms, generating a norm-based 
regionalism. Collective identity, according to Busse, is states’ identification of its 
behavior with the fate of others in the region. Busse denied ASEAN as a case for 
realism for two reasons. First, the member states’ defense budget up to the 1990s 
43. Helen E.S. Nesadurai, “Attempting Developmental Regionalism through AFTA; Domestic 
Sources of Regional Governance”, the Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, (2003).
44. Etel Solingen, “ASEAN, Quo Vadis? Domestic Coalitions and Regional Cooperation”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, (April 1999).
45. See for instance Amitav Acharya,”Realism, Institutionalism, and the Asian Economic 
Crisis”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, (April 1999); Tivo Kivimaki, “The Long 
Peace of ASEAN”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 1, (2001); and Nikolas Busse, 
“Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, (1999).
Parallel Evolution of Practice and Research on ASEAN Economic Integration: From Paradigm Contestation to Eclectic Theorization
（ 123 ） 123
was modest –both in the absolute amount and relative to GDP– and did not reflect 
security-oriented grouping. Second, the regional policy and behavior did not fit 
the balance-of-power logic. Throughout history, the motive of ASEAN behavior has 
not always been self-help. Instead, norms occur and guide ASEAN foreign policy 
behavior. 
Acharya46 is more moderate than Busse in considering realism’s contribution 
to ASEAN studies. He argues that realism found its relevance in the region 
during the formation of ASEAN. However, as the Association evolves into ASEAN 
Community with certain norms and identity, constructivism is argued to have 
more explanatory power than solely relying on realism. 
With regard to regional economic integration, constructivist perspectives in 
the third phase could be found in the discussion on interdependence and norms. 
Overall, constructivists were more concerned with the construction of the region, 
but the influence of security community theory led the study more into security 
study. However, discussion on ‘region-ness’ would have to include interdependence 
and regional cohesion. Constructivists argued that collective identity is the 
major factor that generates regional cohesion in the face of threats, including 
economic threat. During the financial crisis, ASEAN states’ responses were 
diverging between capital controls and accede to IMF rescue program. But one 
notable common policy was that the states agreed to keep the pace of integration 
with the on-going AFTA, AIA, and AFAS. According to constructivists, collective 
identity was the factor behind deepening integration despite ASEAN institutional 
weakness in the face of crisis. The norms that reflect regional identity is the so-
called “ASEAN way” and it can be traced from ASEAN domestic cultures and 
interaction. Constructivists noticed that the social process of state interactions 
shaped the ASEAN way rather than domestic culture. Indonesia during Sukarno 
did not even close to represent “ASEAN way” culture of non-interference and non-
use of force. The interplay nature between norms and actors makes norms subject 
to change due to changing context that requires actors to adjust. To such 
constructivists as Haacke, the ‘ASEAN way’ has changed partially through 
social process and in time might change generally if ASEAN is to strengthen its 
institutional capacity.47 
46. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order, (Oxon: Routledge, 2001). 
47. Jurgen Haacke, “ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: A Constructivist Assessment”, 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 3 (2003). 
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4. Acceleration Phase (2003-now)
The latest phase of the scholarship started in 2003 was marked with the 
signing of ASEAN Community 2015. In contrast to the previous decade, the 
scholarship during this phase grew more confidence and optimism toward 
regional economic integration, not only in the Southeast Asian region, but also 
with an expectation to include East Asia in the process of integration. From 
economic perspectives, many studies reaffirm the correlation between regional 
integration, FDI and economic growth in the region. Intra-regional trade remains 
approximately 25% of total trade annually. However, integration contributes 
significantly to the increase of inward, outward, and intraregional FDI. CLMV 
countries have benefitted more from the increase of trade and FDI compared to 
ASEAN 6. Although suffering revenue loss from tariff cuts, they have enjoyed 
increased income from growing trade and investment.48 Economists also found 
that regional integration increases economic interdependence in certain sectors.49
Theoretical debate at this stage has been shifting following the evolution of 
ASEAN economic integration. There are at least five characteristics of theoretical 
debate in this phase. First, studies of ASEAN’s institutional development by 
neoliberal-institutionalism are gaining momentum. The evolution of ASEAN’s 
economic integration from AFTA to ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
confirms path-dependent institutionalists’ prescription. Studies on institutional 
development have been increasing, especially because ASEAN institutions are 
comparatively distinctive to that of Western European institutions. Increasing 
institutional engagement with East Asian partners enhances the discussion of the 
possibility of East Asian regional integration. Only few studies focused on 
interregional relations and comparative regionalism.
Second, the dominance of realist approach in economic integration is 
decreasing, although realist dominance in political and security issues is still in 
place. Most realists are skeptical towards the prospect of ASEAN Community 
building. Firstly, power and sovereignty considerations are still dominant in 
48. See for instance Michael G. Plummer and David Cheong, “FDI Effects of ASEAN 
Integration”, Region et Developpement, No. 29 (2009); and P. Srinivasan, M. Kalaivani and P. 
Ibrahim, “FDI and the Economic Growth in the ASEAN Countries: Evidence from Cointegration 
Approach and Causality Test”, Journal of Management Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2010).  
49. See Myrna S. Austria, “The Pattern of Intra-ASEAN Trade in the Priority Goods Sector”, 
REPSF Project No. 03/006e, (August 2004); and David J. Dennis and Zainal Aznam Yusof, 
“Developing Indicators for ASEAN Integration: A Preliminary Survey for a Roadmap”, REPSF 
Project No. 02/001, (August 2003).
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states ’ policies, making it difficult to produce a supranational regional 
organization with strong institutional power. The on-going economic integration 
is considered superficial, as states are only trying to create the image of cohesive 
regionalism while the foreign affairs are mostly conducted by bilateral rather than 
regional relations. Realists also argue that the liberalist claim on the primacy of 
cooperation, democratic stability, and civil society is not evident in ASEAN state-
driven regionalism.50  
Third, liberalists tend to disagree with realists’ state-centered and balance-
of-power-oriented points of view. Acknowledging institutional weakness and 
slow pace integration among Southeast Asian countries, liberalists see progress, 
spillover, and convergence between bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism 
in the global order. Some among liberalists try to convince that bilateralism 
and regionalism in Southeast Asia are building blocks to multilateralism, and 
ASEAN does not show any sign to resort to become an introvert regional trading 
bloc. Some others are quite critical towards the lack of political commitments 
to the institutional development. Unequal development between economic and 
political integration made any liberalist analysis on ASEAN integration considers 
multilevel or multidimensional regionalism.51 
Fourth, the constructivism approach in explaining ASEAN economic 
integration has not only been growing in the number of its proponents, but also 
enhancing its theoretical explanation. Deriving from the assumption that ASEAN 
has been successful in realizing a certain form of community, the mainstream of 
constructivists argues that ideas, culture and norms provide the best explanation 
of ASEAN regional integration.52 The focus of its study has shifted from the 
formation of security community to the transitional process of the evolving 
regional identity and the possibility of East Asian regionalism.53
50. See for instance, Shaun Narine, “ASEAN in the 21st Century: A Skeptical Review”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.22, No. 3, (September 2009).
51. See for example, John Ravenhill, “Fighting Irrelevance: An Economic Community with 
ASEAN Characteristics”, Working Paper (ANU-RSPAS), No. 2007/03, (July, 2007); Michael 
G. Plummer and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “Integration Strategies for ASEAN: Alone, Together, 
or Together with Neighbors”, East-West Center Working Paper (Economic Series) , No. 92, 
(November 2007); and Chistopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and 
Institutionalization, (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).
52. Tivo Kivimaki, “Power, Interest, or Culture: Is There a Paradigm that Explains ASEAN 
Political Role Best?”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, (December 2008).
53. Alice D. Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, (California: Stanford University Press, 2009); Dirk 
Nabers, “The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN + 3”, 
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Fifth, the main debate on ASEAN regional economic integration is now 
between rationalists and constructivists. Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 
(1998) have predicted this trend since constructivism studies on ASEAN starts 
growing.54 Criticism toward constructivist perspectives includes two main issues. 
The first issue is the explanatory power of identity, ideas, culture and norms as 
the drivers of regional integration. According to rationalists, the test for ideational 
forces explanatory power is disputes among states, instead of cooperation, and 
mechanisms or triggers that force institutionalization of certain ideas and norms, 
which is the second issue.55 When states are in disputes, such as South China 
Sea territorial disputes, rationalists argue that norms do not really work out to 
regulate states’ behavior. Recurring incidents in the South China Sea prove that 
there are other factors than norms that drive states’ behavior. External shocks 
and changes of the international and regional structure also create pressures for 
institutionalization of certain ideas and norms, apart from socialization of the 
ideas and norms themselves. The time it took for socialization process limits the 
explanatory power of ideas, culture and norms on ASEAN economic integration. 
On the contrary, states’ policy convergence to collective ideas, culture and norms 
immediately after materialistic changes endorses theoretical explanation on 
mechanisms of how ideational and materialistic forces engage. As alternative 
to norms socialization, scholars such as Stubbs, Jetschke, Rüland, and Kim,56 
suggested historical institutionalism, cultural realism and strategic preference 
theories as guidance to explain materialization of the “ASEAN way” ideas and 
norms. 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 2003); Takashi Terada and 
Bernard Ong, “Japan and the Management of Transatlantic Crisis: International Responses and 
Domestic Struggles”, Contemporary Politics, (2011).
54. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, “International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn 
1998).
55. See Nicholas Khoo, “Deconstructing ASEAN Security Community: A Review Essay”, 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 4, (2004); and Kim Min-Hyung, “Theorizing 
ASEAN Integration”, Asian Perspective, No. 35, (2011).
56. Richard Stubbs, “The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutionalization and the Challenge 
to ‘Global’ Governance”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, (2008); Anja Jetschke and Jürgen 
Rüland, “Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: The Cultural Limits of ASEAN Cooperation”, The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2009); and Kim Min-hyung, Ibid.
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The Parallel Evolution: A Case for Eclecticism?
Classifying ASEAN economic integration development since its inception up 
to now seems to have convergence with theoretical development on the topic. In 
this article, we have classified ASEAN economic integration development into 
four phases as categorized by the character of institutionalization of economic 
integration among Southeast Asian countries. 
Observing the history of ASEAN regional economic integration theorization, 
we now understand that it is simplistic to say that the practice of ASEAN 
economic integration is so complex that no single paradigm can provide sufficient 
explanatory power that meets any student’s curiosity. Any student would easily be 
lost in the paradoxes and controversies in the theoretical discourse on the subject. 
Explanations from one paradigm may meet with paradox inflicted by strong 
criticism from other paradigms. This is the point where many scholars suggest 
eclecticism to bridge contesting theories and paradigms.57 
The problem with theoretical eclecticism has always been the bridge 
between differing ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions 
of each theory.58 Approaching one research problem, such as regional economic 
integration, with theoretical eclecticism requires the conflicting theories to 
find “peace”, so that the eclectic explanation does not contradict itself in the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological questions. Realism and liberalism, 
for instance, base their theories on the differing assumptions on international 
system, which are anarchy and order. Their focus of analysis lies on the different 
levels. While most realists focus on the “world of states”, liberalists analyze 
actors in a few different levels that include international organization(s), 
transnational actors, governments, domestic political elites, and civil society. 
Realism and liberalism also differ in their research problem between addressing 
balance of power and building cooperation. By and large, the question of problem 
(issues), actors, and levels of analysis represent ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumption of each paradigm. 
In the brief exposition of theories and practices of ASEAN economic 
57. See for instance, Jürgen Rüland, “Southeast Asia: New Research Trends in Political Science 
and International Relations”, Südostasien Actuell, No. 4, (2006). In his review, Ruland suggests 
readers to discuss all fields in order to comprehend Southeast Asia, and avoid entrapment of one 
perspective’s limitation, or what constructivists called ‘myopia’. 
58. For the detailed discussion, see, for example, Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, “After 
Postpositivism?: The Promises of Critical Realism”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, 2000.
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integration above, we have learnt that the factors, processes and effects of 
the integration occurred at different levels which generate complexities. The 
integration process operates at three different levels based on the involving 
actors: (1) market-driven integration, where the three major economies (Japan, 
the EU and the US) plus recently the rising China, play significant contribution 
in the formation of regional production network; (2) institution-driven integration, 
where states institutionalize economic cooperation and integration in the region; 
and (3) private-sector-driven integration, where economic integration operates 
between private sectors in sub-regional cooperation projects. The genesis of 
institutionalization also derives from three different levels, including (1) systemic 
level, where international order, global governance, balance of power and external 
shocks and changes stimulate regionalist policies; (2) regional or sub-ordinate 
level, where states in the given region bargain, deliberate, socialize, and make 
decisions on collective action; and (3) domestic or internal level, where government 
and non-state actors contest for influencing regional policies. 
It is important to note that if one analyzes ASEAN regional integration 
carefully through these different levels, one could find that the paradoxes 
that critics of ASEAN often address are, in many cases, concerning different 
issues, operated by different actors, and at the different levels. For instance, 
criticisms are at times addressed on the contradiction between the signing of 
ASEAN Economic Community and the compliance of states to meet the various 
roadmaps agreed. With eclectic approach, one can easily bridge the contradiction 
by analyzing separately the institutional process of the AEC signing, and the 
institutionalization process of the implementation procedures and mechanisms 
which include different problems, processes and actors. In this case, all paradigms 
can contribute positively to the theorizing on the genesis of AEC and its 
institutional form. 
Students of ASEAN regionalism have been benefitted from the complexity 
and peculiarity of international relations in the region. Paradoxes and 
contradictories which are presented by a number of theories open the opportunity 
for a multilevel and multidisciplinary approach, as it involves multifaceted 
process that is exercised by various actors. This complexity allows the use of 
theoretical eclecticism, as the differing assumptions of each theory are suited in 
the multifaceted character of ASEAN regionalism. 
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Concluding Remarks
Let us summarize our discussions throughout the article. Periodization of 
the history of ASEAN economic integration, based on its economic institutional 
development, appears to coincide with the development of theorization on the 
topic. During the formation years when the activities of the member states 
focused on building communication and confidence among each other, descriptive 
studies from realist perspectives dominated the scholarship in the region. This 
obviously makes sense as the regional collective economic activities were merely 
non-existent, while the drive for regionalism mostly originated from extra-regional 
pressures, namely Vietnam and the Cold War situated great power competition. 
During the second phase of the history of ASEAN integration, when 
cooperation projects and PTA were initiated, studies on ASEAN economies were 
dominated by the political economy of development. The distinctive characteristics 
of Southeast Asian capitalism, economic miracle, transnational Chinese 
business network, regional production network and state-business relationship 
appeared to be the dominant topic of the political economy of development in 
the region. Research on economic integration was rarely found, mostly because 
economic cooperation projects and PTAs were unsuccessful and too insignificant 
for measuring integration. Economic cooperation was considered as part of 
“comprehensive security” conception of the institution, while three crises in the 
1970s and 1980s become important factor that incited regionalist policymaking. 
Thus, the study on regional integration was still dominated by realism during this 
phase.
The third period, which could be called as initial stage of integration, marked 
the new era of studies on ASEAN economic integration. With the formation of 
AFTA, realists, liberalists and economists were competing in providing the most 
reasonable explanation of the factors, institutional form, development and effects 
of AFTA. Crisis remained an important factor in debating ASEAN regional 
integration. Debates between neorealists and neoliberal-institutionalists on 
the formation, institutional form, processes and effects of ASEAN enriched the 
regionalism studies of the region. The emergence of studies from constructivist 
perspective, although limited in number and less developed in discussing economic 
integration, started to gain attention and many students in the 1990s. 
The fourth period, when the economic integration in the region was 
accelerated by the signing of ASEAN Economic Community as a single market 
and production base by 2015, shifted partially the debate from the dichotomy of 
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realism and liberalism, into rationalism versus constructivism. Constructivist 
perspectives are increasingly popular among scholars on the region, but 
rationalists are still dominating the studies on the region as the recurring crisis 
and conflict defy the explanatory power of ideational factors.
Throughout the article, our arguments have clarified two main features of 
ASEAN regional economic integration theorization. First, periodization of ASEAN 
economic integration into the four periods above correlates with the development 
of its theorization. As ASEAN economic integration developed, the theorization 
and debates among contesting theories also increased. And second, the complexity 
and peculiarity of the characteristics of ASEAN economic integration provide 
a suitable case for theoretical eclecticism. ASEAN multifaceted integration 
processes involve different actors with relative autonomy who operate at different 
levels of the process. This characteristic allows differing paradigms with differing 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions to be employed 
simultaneously. Without eclectic approach, it is difficult to comprehensively 
understand the complex nature of ASEAN regional economic integration. 
Comprehensive understanding of ASEAN can also be useful in analyzing the 
future significance of the Association in the face of the establishment of new 
regional frameworks such as East Asia Summit and Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
Being the successful mediating actor in the region so far and the locus of great 
power’s competition over influence in the region, ASEAN’s role in political, 
economic and security relations in the Asia-Pacific will remain significant. The 
dynamics of politics, economy and security in the region cannot be analyzed by 
undermining the role of ASEAN. 
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